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Abstract
Global warming is currently a major challenge facing the world. There are widespread ongoing
efforts in the form of summits, conferences, etc., to find satisfactory ways of surmounting this
challenge. The basic objective of all such efforts can be summarized as conception and formation
of protocols to reduce the pace of global carbon levels. Game theory and mechanism design
provide a natural modeling tool for capturing the strategic dynamics involved in global warming
related problems. This dissertation explores for the first time the use of voting mechanisms in
the context of solving the central problems, namely, allocation of emission caps and reduction
quotas to strategic emitting agents (countries).
The contribution of this dissertation is two-fold. The first contribution is to develop an
elegant game theoretic model that accurately captures the strategic interactions among different
emitting agents in a global warming setting. This model facilitates a convenient way of exploring
a mechanism design approach for solving important allocation problems in the global warming
context. The second contribution is to propose and explore a novel approach, based on voting
mechanisms, to solve two problems: (1) allocating emission caps and (2) allocating reduction
quotas to strategic agents.
Our work investigates the use of voting mechanisms that satisfy four desirable properties:
(1) non-dictatorship, (2) strategy-proofness, (3) efficiency, and (4) anonymity. In particular, we
explore the median selection, maximum order statistic selection, and general Kth order statistic
selection voting mechanisms. Our results clearly show that only trivial allocations satisfy all
the above properties simultaneously. We next investigate the use of voting mechanisms for
the dual problem, namely, allocation of emission reductions to emitting agents. Here, we show
that non-trivial allocations are possible, however an important property, individual rationality,
might be compromised.
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The investigations in the thesis bring out certain limitations in applying voting mechanisms
that satisfy all the four properties above. Nevertheless, the insights obtained provide valuable
guidelines for solving emission allocation related problems in a principled and informed way.
